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CONTRACT LAW AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL
OF ECONOMICS
CHRISTOPHER T. WONNELL*
INTRODUCTION
B ECAUSE both contract law and economic theory are concerned in
large part with marketplace phenomena,1 it is important to consider
what effects developments in economic thought may have on contract
law. One such development is the revival of interest in the Austrian
school of economics2 on the part of the economics profession.3 The basic
tenets of the Austrian tradition, articulated in more detail below," in-
lude an emphasis on the division of knowledge among market partici-
pants,5 a theory of competition and of the market as a continuing process
of learning and adaptation rather than an equilibrium state6 and a corn-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 1979,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1982, University of Michigan.
I would like to express my appreciation to the following individuals whose comments
on early drafts of this Article were very helpful: Larry Alexander, Randy Barnett, Elea-
nor Blais, Don Dripps, Paul Horton and Bernard Siegan. Errors are of course my
responsibility.
1. See L. Friedman, Contract Law in America 20 (1965) ("The law of contract is...
roughly coextensive with the free market. Liberal nineteenth-century economics fits in
neatly with the law of contracts so viewed."); Kronman & Posner, Introduction: Eco-
nomic Theory and Contract Law, in The Economics of Contract Law 1 (A. Kronman &
R. Posner eds. 1979) ("Since buying and selling ... are quintessentially economic activi-
ties, it would seem that economics should have something useful to say to students of
contract law.").
2. For a good summary of the development and tenets of the Austrian School, see
Economic Thought The Austrian School, 4 Int'l Ency. Soc. Sci. 458 (1968).
The Austrian tradition dates back to the publication of Carl Menger's Grundsatze in
1871. The Grundsatze was not translated into English for many years, but indirectly
influenced English economists through the work of, among others, Friederich Wieser and
Eugen Bohm-Bawerk. See, e.g., E. Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capital xxvii-
xxviii (1971) (first edition published in 1891); F. Wieser, Natural Value xxxiii (1971) (first
edition published in 1893). This influence is recounted in the preface to the English ver-
sion of Menger's book. See C. Menger, Principles of Economics 37-40 (1950).
3. See Kirzner, Introduction, in Method, Process, and Austrian Economics I (I.
Kirzner ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Austrian Economics]; Roche, The Relevance of
Friedrich A. Hayek, in Essays on Hayek 1 (F. Machlup ed. 1976).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See, e.g., Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 519
(1945) [hereinafter cited as Hayek I], reprinted in F. Hayek, Individualism and Economic
Order 50-54 (1948); Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 4 Economica 33, 49-53 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as Hayek II], reprinted in F. Hayek, supra, at 77; Loasby, Economics of
Dispersed and Incomplete Information, in Austrian Economics, supra note 3, at 114-15.
See infra Part II.A.
6. See, e.g., C. Menger, supra note 2, at 74 ("Nothing is more certain than that the
degree of economic progress of mankind will still, in future epochs, be commensurate
with the degree of progress of human knowledge."); Littlechild, Equilibrium and the
Market Process, in Austrian Economics, supra note 3, at 86 (For the Austrian, "the mar-
ket is a process. The state of the market is continually changing. The market process is
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mitment to a radical methodological individualism and subjectivism.'
The thesis of this Article is that the Austrian school of economics has
much to contribute to contract law, and in particular to the recurring
tension between freedom of contract and the idea that a party should be
excused from contractual duties because of her insufficient knowledge,
foresight or bargaining power. This problem area includes, of course, the
idea that a court will not weigh the adequacy of consideration,' as well as
the competing concept of unconscionability.9 Also included are the doc-
trine of impossibility' ° and the closely related doctrine of mistake."
characterized by profits and losses as the judgments made by entrepreneurs turn out to be
correct or incorrect."). See infra Part II.B.
7. See L. Mises, Human Action 143 (2d ed. 1963) ("Society is the outcome of con-
scious and purposeful behavior."); 1 M. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State 2 (1962)
("Only individuals have ends, and can act to attain them."); Lachmann, Methodological
Individualism and the Market Economy, in Roads to Freedom-Essays in Honour of
Friederich A. von Hayek 91-92 (E. Streissler ed. 1969), reprinted in L. Lachmann, Capi-
tal, Expectations, and the Market Process 152 (1977) ("We now have to consider the
significance of [individual plans] for the methodology of the social sciences. It seems to
us that they provide the justification for 'methodological individualism' ...... ") (footnote
omitted). See infra Part II.C. For an example of a subjectivist critique, although one
which operates within both the Keynesian and Austrian traditions, see G. Shackle, Epis-
temics and Economics (1972).
8. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 4-3, at 136-37 (2d ed. 1977);
Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 Yale L.J. 598, 600 (1969);
see Black Indus., Inc. v. Bush, 110 F. Supp. 801, 805 (D.N.J. 1953) ("relative values of
the consideration in a contract between business men dealing at arm's length without
fraud will not affect the validity of the contract").
9. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (courts may modify or refuse to enforce unconsciona-
ble contract); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1979) (same) [hereinafter cited
as Second Restatement]. The unconscionability section of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) "is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the
contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable." U.C.C. § 2-302 official com-
ment 1 (1978). For an enlightening discussion of the definition of "unconscionable," see
Epstein, Unconscionability: 4 Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293 (1975).
10. Impossibility or impracticability claims typically involve some assertion that per-
formance itself has become more costly, burdensome or impossible. See, e.g., Ontario
Deciduous Fruit-Growers' Ass'n v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co., 134 Cal. 21, 24, 66 P. 28,
29 (1901) (party excused from delivery of specific crop of peaches when drought de-
stroyed the crop); Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312-15 (K.B. 1863) (fire in
music hall excused performance of agreement to lease hall); U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978) (fail-
ure of performance by a party to contract not breach if performance made impracticable
by occurrence of contingency the nonoccurrence of which was basic assumption of con-
tracting parties); Second Restatement, supra note 9, § 261 (same). Both the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Second Restatement use the term "impossibility" to encom-
pass "impracticability." See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978); Second Restatement, supra note 9,
ch. 11. This Article will do the same.
Frustration of purpose involves a claim that, although performance may be no more
costly than anticipated, it has been rendered pointless by the intervention of some event.
J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 13-10, at 495; see, e.g., Doherty v. Monroe Eck-
stein Brewing Co., 198 A.D. 708, 710-12, 191 N.Y.S. 59, 61-62 (1921) (purpose of lease
for saloon frustrated by Prohibition); Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (C.A. 1903) (purpose of
contract to lease building in order to enable lessee to view royal procession was frustrated
when the procession was canceled).
11. Where both parties share a common assumption about a vital fact upon
which they based their bargain and that assumption is false, the transaction
1986] AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
One caveat is appropriate at the outset of this Article. In light of the
way in which law is presently taught, abstract discussion of any legal
doctrine is likely to evoke images of standard casebook illustrations-
"hard cases" with stark fact situations that test the limits of legal princi-
ples. Thus, the unconscionability doctrine creates images of door-to-
door salesmen selling $300 refrigerators to welfare recipients for over
$1200, "2 and the impossibility doctrine suggests the problem of holding a
party to a contract to lease a music hall that has since burned to the
ground. 3 It is not clear that Austrian, or any other, economics has
much to contribute to resolving such aberrational cases.
Unconscionability and impossibility claims have, however, been
pressed in circumstances touching more closely on the ordinary workings
of the market economy. In general, courts have thus far hesitated to
limit the principle of freedom of contract in such cases. This Article asks
whether such hesitation is justified. That is, should it be unconscionable
for a creditor to accelerate the balance of a debt on default, 4 for a bank
to set off debts of a depositor against his account, '5 for a secured creditor
to insist that a debtor not sell collateral without the prior consent of the
creditor 6 or for a seller to keep a security interest in previously
purchased goods where payments are applied first to the items purchased
first? 7 Should contractual performance be held impossible when costs
have risen fifty-eight percent,' 8 when one party becomes insolvent or
bankrupt,' 9 when the necessary labor for performance becomes scarce20
or when a party to a commercial lease is unable to obtain needed
may be avoided if because of the mistake a quite different exchange of values
occurs from the exchange of values the parties contemplated unless the risk is
otherwise allocated by agreement, custom or law.
J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 9-26, at 300 (footnote omitted); see G. Palmer,
Mistake and Unjust Enrichment 13-17 (1962); Second Restatement, supra note 9, § 152.
12. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 190, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 264-65
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
13. Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
14. See Simon v. New Hampshire Say. Bank, 112 N.H. 372, 375, 296 A.2d 913, 916
(1972) (holding no); King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 169, 330 A.2d 1, 5
(1974) (same). But see Fontaine v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 111 RI. 6, 11-12, 298 A.2d
521, 523-24 (1973) (acceleration without prior notice is unconscionable).
15. See Greene v. Citizens & S. Bank, 134 Ga. App. 73, 76, 213 S.E.2d 175, 177-78
(1975) (holding no).
16. See O'Brien v. Larson, 11 Wash. App. 52, 53-58, 521 P.2d 228, 229-32 (1974)
(holding no).
17. See Singer Co. v. Gardner, 65 N.J. 403, 410-14, 323 A.2d 457, 462-63 (1974)
(holding no). But see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (consumer contract that did not close off first debt first may be
unconscionable).
18. See Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76, 82 (contract excused
where contemplated ice holding method proved not commercially feasible), Vicated, 523
P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1974).
19. See Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 267-70 (S.D.N.Y 1978)
(holding no), aft'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Howard v. Nicholson, 556
S.W.2d 477, 483-84 (Mo. App. 1977) (impossible where bankruptcy of prospective com-
mercial tenants was not contemplated by parties).
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financing?21
In a sense, neither economic theory nor principles of contract law un-
equivocally answer these concrete questions, because both disciplines are
essentially abstract.22 Rather, the inquiry of economics and contract law
concerns the general circumstances under which it is appropriate to leave
the allocation of concrete rights and duties to the parties. Of course, any
assertion of "appropriateness" requires normative as well as positive23
analysis. The law-and-economics school can be criticized for its ten-
dency to argue policy conclusions directly from its cause-and-effect anal-
ysis, while assuming the unspoken norm that economic efficiency is a
desirable goal. The difference between neoclassical economics24 and the
Austrian school, however, concerns positive analysis, not the desirability
of particular ends. This Article seeks to contribute solely to the positive
economic analysis of the effects of alternative legal rules. Of course, if
one is indifferent to efficiency and the creation or destruction of wealth,
the positive analysis may be of little interest. No such pretense of indif-
ference is maintained here, for it is assumed without much argument 25
that efficiency is in fact a good thing.26 The positive analysis, however, is
logically independent of this ethical assumption, and therefore should be
useful to those who, for ethical reasons, may disagree with certain sug-
gestions of appropriate policy contained in this Article.
Part I presents the approach of traditional neoclassical economics to
the problems of contract law. Part II then describes at some length the
major assumptions of the Austrian school and how they differ from the
20. See Hudson v. D & V Mason Contractors, Inc., 252 A.2d 166, 169 (Del. Super.
1969) (holding no).
21. See Marcovich Land Corp. v. J.J. Newberry Co., 413 N.E.2d 935, 942-44 (Ind.
App. 1980) (holding no).
22. See L. Friedman, supra note 1, at 20-21 ("Contract law is abstraction-what is
left in the law relating to agreements when all particularities of person and subject-matter
are removed .... Liberal nineteenth-century economics ... too, had the abstracting
habit."). Friedman's thesis, however, is that law as a whole has become less abstract in
this century. See id. at 215.
23. "Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position
or normative judgments. As Keynes says, it deals with 'what is,' not with 'what ought to
be.' " M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 4 (1953).
24. "Neoclassical economics" is a term given to an economic tradition dating from
the "marginal revolution" against classical economics in the 1870's. See Hausman, Intro-
duction, in The Philosophy of Economics 33 (D. Hausman ed. 1984). The classical econ-
omists held that the price of a good is determined by its cost of production. See C.
Menger, supra note 2, at 149. The marginal revolution was a product of the independent
discovery by William Stanley Jevons in England, Carl Menger in Austria and Leon
Walras in France that the causal sequence is in fact the reverse-that the price of re-
sources was determined by the amount consumers would pay for goods produced from
those resources. See Hausman, supra, at 33.
25. A few words in defense of efficiency as an ethical concern are presented in the
Conclusion of this Article.
26. For a discussion of the normative status of efficiency, see Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 509, 526-48 (1980); Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hof-
stra L. Rev. 487, 502-06 (1980).
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neoclassical approach. No prior knowledge of Austrian economics is as-
sumed. Indeed it is best to delay consideration of the Austrian tenets
until the neoclassical paradigm to which the Austrians are responding is
itself explained. Part III analyzes several major problems of contract
doctrine from an Austrian perspective and argues that many of the "as-
sumptions" made in neoclassical economic models not only are unneces-
sary for the idea of freedom of contract, but in fact tend to mask some of
the most important reasons for maintaining that freedom. The Conclu-
sion presents some directions for contract law and policy that would,
under Austrian economics, be desirable.
I. THE APPROACH OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
A. The "Victimless Crimes" Theory of Contract
A good place to start the economic analysis of contract law is with the
following contention of Professor Richard Epstein:
[The] general regime of freedom of contract can be defended from two
points of view. One defense is utilitarian. So long as the tort law pro-
tects the interests of strangers to the agreement, its enforcement will
tend to maximize the welfare of the parties to it, and therefore the
good of society as a whole. The alternative defense is on libertarian
grounds. One of the first functions of the law is to guarantee to indi-
viduals a sphere of influence in which they will be able to operate,
without having to justify themselves to the state or to third parties: if
one individual is entitled to do within the confines of the tort law what
he pleases with what he owns, then two individuals who operate with
those same constraints should have the same right with respect to their
mutual affairs against the rest of the world.2 7
Economic analysis is concerned with only the "utilitarian," or at least
consequentialist, argument for freedom of contract. Epstein's conse-
quentialist argument might be characterized as a "victimless crimes" the-
ory of contract-because no third party is hurt, no one can complain.
But this clearly will not do. If X and Y enter into a contract, the most
obvious victims of the contract are X's competitors for Y's service and
Y's competitors for X's service. The injuries that result from such fair
competition are not generally compensable in tort actions.2" In Epstein's
libertarian argument, of course, one might say that X's competitors have
no right to Y's services and thus no third party's rights have been victim-
ized by the contract. From the perspective of the consequentialist argu-
ment, however, this contention begs the question about the appropriate
assignment of rights because under Epstein's libertarian argument the
appropriate assignment of rights is whatever the parties to a contract
27. Epstein, supra note 9, at 293-94 (footnote omitted).
28. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 1012 (5th ed. 1984).
Of course, a contract might generate other forms of externalities that would be covered
by tort law. Such coverage is necessary to ensure that firms consider the full marginal
social costs of their behavior.
1986]
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decide. The challenge of the economic theory of contracts is to explain
how freedom of contract can be beneficial even though the doctrine di-
verts resources from alternative uses.
Epstein's theory does suggest the important truth that contracts can
simultaneously benefit both contracting parties. Economists have, of
course, been making this point since the time of Adam Smith.29 But
because the core materials of our legal system are appellate opinions that
depict contracting parties as adversaries, the argument bears repetition in
the legal context. A contract can, of course, be in the ex ante 30 interest of
both parties and nevertheless lead to litigation. For example, one party
may partially perform first, and thus leave the other party with no fur-
ther incentive to comply with the contract. 3I Alternatively, the parties
may have rationally placed a risk on the superior risk-bearer,3 2 but once
the feared loss accrues, the risk-bearer has an incentive to escape the
contract. 33 Even if one focuses solely on the ex ante status of the parties
to the contract, it is certainly not clear that all contracts are victimless-
one of the parties may have been mistaken about her true interests. This
possibility is discussed in detail later in the Article.34
B. The Efficiency of Market Prices Under Perfect Competition
Because contract law cannot be defended as having no victims, the real
question becomes why the victimizing of the contracting parties' compet-
itors (broadly construed to include anyone else with whom the other
party could have contracted) is defensible. Traditional neoclassical eco-
nomics offers an explanation. X chooses to contract with Y rather than
some Y,, and Y chooses to contract with X rather than some X,, because
X and Y are somehow in a position to offer better price or other contract
29. M. Friedman & R. Friedman, Free to Choose 39 (1980) ("Ever since Adam
Smith there has been virtual unanimity among economists, whatever their ideological
position on other issues, that international free trade is in the best interest of the trading
countries and of the world.").
30. On the importance of ex ante analysis of legal problems, see Easterbrook, The
Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10-12 (1984).
31. In Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939), Wunder,
the lessee, refused to restore mined property to its original condition after the lessor
Groves had fully performed. Id. at 165, 286 N.W. at 236. "[F]rom the outset, on
Groves' part the contract was executed except for [lessees'] right to continue using the
property for the stated term." Id. at 164-65, 286 N.W. at 235-36. There was no indica-
tion that Wunder had any use for the right to further use the property, so it is not surpris-
ing that Wunder saw no further need to comply with the contract.
32. On the criteria that influence proper allocations of coatractual risks, see Posner &
Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis,
6 J. Legal Stud. 83, 89-90 (1977), reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra
note 1, at 122-23.
33. See Pacific Allied v. Century Steel Prods., Inc., 162 Cal. App. 2d 70, 72-74, 327
P.2d 547, 549-50 (1958) (defendant agreed to reimburse plaintiff for labor costs in experi-
menting with installing defendant's steel forms, but defendant refused to pay when pro-
ject required extensive labor costs).
34. See infra notes 105-75, 190-201 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54
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terms35 than are X, and y,. 3 6 Resources are thus allocated in accordance
with governing prices, but the question remains whether those prices
themselves efficiently allocate resources.
The well-known answer of neoclassical economics is that prices will
allocate resources efficiently given assumptions that collectively have
come to be called "perfect competition." Perfect competition exists
when all sellers in an industry produce a homogeneous product, each
market has so many buyers and sellers that no single person's actions can
affect the market price, all resources are perfectly mobile and thus can be
switched readily from one use to another and consumers, firms and re-
source owners have complete knowledge of all relevant facts.3" Although
the legal literature has sometimes acknowledged the neoclassical conclu-
sion that freely-set prices efficiently allocate resources, such literature
rarely indicates why perfect competition ensures this result.38 Yet with-
out knowing the reason freedom of contract would be efficient under per-
fect competition, it is impossible to say to what extent real world
deviations from the assumptions of perfect competition would introduce
serious inefficiencies into the contracting process.
Both neoclassical and Austrian economists emphasize that market
prices force firms to consider the real costs39 production imposes by the
diversion of scarce resources. In a perfectly competitive economy, the
owners of land, labor and capital would know exactly where they could
command the highest return and would move to that use instantane-
ously. Firms where those resources could make the largest contribution
toward valuable consumer goods would be in a position to offer the re-
source owners the highest returns and under perfectly competitive condi-
tions would be forced to do so."4 As a result, each expanding firm's cost
of production increases by the amount it must pay the owners of re-
35. Hereafter, in keeping with the neoclassical tradition, the terms of trade will sim-
ply be called "prices," although other contractual terms are included in the term. Subse-
quent sections of the Article will discuss important differences between prices and other
contract terms. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
36. This conclusion assumes the neoclassical conception of "economic man" who ra-
tionally maximizes his utility (satisfaction of his desires) subject to his budget constraints.
G. Stigler, The Theory of Price 46 (3d ed. 1966).
37. See E. Mansfield, Principles of Microeconomics 204 (4th ed. 1983); Eisenberg,
The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 746 (1982).
38. For example, Professor Eisenberg has noted that under perfect competition price
tends to equal marginal cost, but he did not fully explain why that result is efficient. See
Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 746-47.
39. In a perfectly competitive economy, each firm produces at a level of output where
its marginal cost-the cost of producing an additional unit of output plus a profit--equals
the governing price. See E. Mansfield, supra note 37, at 206. This behavior enhances
efficiency. The production of any good entails real costs, since it diverts scarce inputs
such as land, labor and capital away from the production of other goods. See F. Wieser,
supra note 2, at 173. For example, consumers may value an additional 100 units of some
good X at $500, but that does not mean that the production of those 100 units would be
efficient if the result were to divert resources away from the production of goods Y and Z
that consumers value at $700.
40. See F. Wieser, supra note 2, at 70-71.
1986]
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sources in order to induce them away from other uses. Because perfectly
competitive firms maximize profits by setting marginal cost equal to the
price of their product, consumers receive only those goods for which they
are willing to pay enough to divert resources from other uses.4'
It is now possible to supplement Professor Epstein's neoclassical de-
fense of freedom of contract: Contracts may have victims, but under the
assumptions of perfect competition, contracts are efficient because they
move resources to the production of those goods that consumers value
most highly.
C. The Problem of Unrealistic Assumptions
The problem with the above reasoning, of course, is that the assump-
tions of the perfect competition model are unrealistic. Commentators in
contract law have been quick to use this argument to support judicial
intervention into the terms of contracts: "[I]f the assumption of a per-
fectly competitive market is relaxed, the stage is set for invoking limits on
the bargain principle based on the quality of the underlying bargain."4
Particular criticism has been directed to the assumptions that firms are
so numerous that none can influence the market price4 3 and that all mar-
ket actors have perfect information.'
Neoclassical economists themselves are of course under no illusion
that the assumptions of their model accurately describe real markets.4
Rather, their defense of the model is based on a methodological theory
generally attributed to an article by Milton Friedman. Friedman argued
41. In economic jargon, marginal-cost pricing is efficient because it ensures that the
"marginal rate of transformation" of any two goods-the rate at which one good can be
"transformed" into another by shifting inputs-is equal to the "marginal rate of substitu-
tion"-the rate at which consumers would be willing to substitute one good for another.
See C. Ferguson & J. Gould, Microeconomic Theory 452-53 (4th ed. 1975).
42. Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 748; see Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Mo-
tives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Une-
qual Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 580-83 (1982) (criticizing freedom of
contract as incoherent and therefore incapable of determining outcomes).
43. With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate trend of
competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has changed
radically.... Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective in-
struments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords en-
abling them to impose a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast host
of vassals.
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum.
L. Rev. 629, 640 (1943).
44. "[W]hen consumers simply misperceive risks, efficiency might be enhanced by
imposing a nondisclaimable duty on the manufacturer." Note, Efficiency and a Rule of
"Free Contract". A Critique of Two Models of Law and Economics, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 978,
984 (1984).
45. See, e.g., M. Friedman, supra note 23, at 15 (perfect competition is "false image of
reality"); E. Mansfield, supra note 37, at 204 ("No industry in the real world, now or in
the past, satisfies all these conditions completely; thus no industry is perfectly competi-
tive. Some agricultural markets may be reasonably close, but even they do not meet all
the requirements.").
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that a model should be assessed by its explanatory and predictive power
rather than by the truth of its assumptions." Because any model must
be simpler than reality to be useful,47 the question is not whether the
assumptions are accurate, but whether it has predictive power.48 Even at
this level, however, it is clear that many markets cannot satisfy the strin-
gent requirements of perfect competition; it is doubtful that prospective
insureds, for example, behave as if they had full knowledge of the terms
of the insurer's contract.
Once one accepts that the market is imperfectly competitive, one must
ask whether courts or other public agencies should remove the remaining
imperfections in contracts.49 Indeed, neoclassical economics finds it hard
to assert that even the complete elimination of freedom of contract would
necessarily be inefficient, because planners could ensure efficient resource
allocation by setting "shadow prices" that individuals could be ordered
to observe.5" If neoclassical economics cannot state unequivocally that
the total abolition of freedom of contract would be inefficient, the eco-
nomic case for defending free contract against minor reforms remains
problematic.
II. THE AUSTRIAN CRITIQUE
In a sense, it is misleading to speak of an Austrian "school" of eco-
nomics in flat contradistinction to the neoclassical school. Such a de-
scription creates images of bitter conflicts on fundamental assumptions
and warring paradigms. The Austrian economists, however, share the
neoclassical premise that the prices of resources are determined by their
contribution to valued final products. 5' Moreover, the image of conflict-
46. See M. Friedman, supra note 23, at 15-16.
47. See E. Mansfield, supra note 37, at 23.
48. Friedman offers an example of predicting a shot by an expert billiard player. He
suggests that good predictions might be reached by assuming that the player makes light-
ning calculations in his mind of the angles revealed by geometric measurements, ball
speed, etc. Even though one does not believe billiard players actually make such calcula-
tions, one assumes that unless they were in some way able to make the shot as if they
made such calculation, they would not in fact be expert billiard players. See M. Fried-
man, supra note 23, at 21.
49. If the goal is prices equal to marginal costs, but due to certain monopolistic ele-
ments in the market the prices in contracts slightly exceed marginal costs, one might
argue that a court should make the necessary contractual revisions. See supra notes 42-
44 and accompanying text.
50. Neoclassical economics thus has trouble with more radical critiques of freedom of
contract such as those emanating from representatives of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 42, at 564 n.3; Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 627 (1983). Although CLS has been unclear
about its positive program, a major element of its critique concerns the unequal allocation
of wealth and power in a market society and contract law's alleged contribution to that
inequality. See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 629-31.
51. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. In fact, Carl Menger, the founder
of the Austrian school, was also one of the three founders of neoclassical economics. See
Hayek, The Place of Menger's Grundsatze in the History of Economic Thought, in Carl
Menger and the Austrian School of Economics 2 (J. Hicks & W. Weber eds. 1973).
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ing "schools" would suggest that neoclassical economists have fought
vigorously against the Austrian critique, but in large measure they have
not.5" The sense in which Austrian economics constitutes a separate
"school" is that it opposes the emphasis that neoclassical economists
have placed on relatively unimportant features of an actual economy. 53
In particular, the Austrian school has emphasized the importance of a
division of knowledge among market participants,54 the growth of the
knowledge in a market process5" and the methodological functions and
limits of economic analysis. 56
A. The Division of Knowledge Among Market Participants
The Austrian critique begins with the premise that efficiency requires
the use of vast quantities of knowledge that exist in no single place but
only in the separate minds of millions of individuals.5 " The neoclassical
assumption of perfect knowledge on the part of the actors or the econo-
mist herself5" ignores this fundamental fact. F. A. Hayek, probably the
best known Austrian economist, stated:
It is difficult to defend economists against the charge that for some 40
to 50 years they have been discussing competition on assumptions that,
if they were true of the real world, would make it wholly uninteresting
and useless. If anyone really knew all about what economic theory
calls the data, competition would indeed be a very wasteful method of
securing adjustment to these facts.59
If knowledge consisted merely of scientific laws knowable in principle by
anyone, that knowledge might be obtained by a sufficiently determined
group of planners-perhaps judges assisted by expert witnesses. The
problem, however, is that so much of what is needed to allocate resources
efficiently is knowledge not of the abstract regularities of natural science
or social science, but of the concrete particulars of time and place, such
as knowledge of available labor supplies, machinery, farmland or unused
stocks of goods.60 Worse yet, contrary to the simplifying assumptions of
neoclassical models, the concrete phenomena are not generic categories
like "land," "labor" and "capital," but highly specific parcels and sub-
parcels of land, particular people and occupational classes, individual
52. The text overstates the similarities in some respects unrelated to this Article. For
example, the Austrian theories of capital and the business cycle differ sharply from those
of mainstream economists. See L. Lachmann, supra note 7, at 267-86.
53. See infra notes 59-99 and accompanying text.
54. See infra Part II.A.
55. See infra Part II.B.
56. See infra Part II.C.
57. See Hayek I, supra note 5, at 519-20, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 77-78;
Loasby, supra note 5, at 114.
58. See supra text accompanying note 37.
59. F. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in The Essence of Hayek 254 (C.
Nishiyama & K. Leube eds. 1984) (emphasis in original).
60. See Hayek I, supra note 5, at 521-22 reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 79-81.
[Vol. 54
AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
machines and buildings that all differ in endless economically relevant
dimensions.6 1
Furthermore, efficient allocation requires a particular type of data de-
tailing the extent to which commodities can be substituted for each other
in production or consumption.62 Thus, rational decisionmaking requires
not only that the particularities of each resource be considered in isola-
tion, but also how well highly specific resources can be transformed into
others or substituted for others. Ludwig Mises, a leading figure in the
Austrian school, stressed the magnitude of this problem, remarking that
"the present state of technological knowledge makes it possible to pro-
duce almost anything out of almost everything. "63
The key Austrian point is not simply the existence of this complexity,
but that market institutions operate to make that complexity manage-
able.' The market works by giving each individual an incentive to use
the concrete information that she possesses and by conveying knowledge
(or, more precisely, substitutes for knowledge) of the relative scarcity of
all other resources of which the person has no direct knowledge in the
form of market prices and other contract terms. 61 In this way each indi-
vidual can act as if she knew the myriad alternative uses for the products
she uses as well as each one of their component resources, and to employ
those products only if her use is one of the most efficient possible.6 If
61. See id. at 522, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 80; Hayek, Socialist Calcula-
tion II: The State of the Debate, in Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on
the Possibility of Socialism (F. Hayek ed. 1935), reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at
153-54; see also L. Mises, supra note 7, at 699 ("The director does not simply have to deal
with coal as such, but with thousands and thousands of pits already in operation in vari-
ous places, and with the possibilities for digging new pits, with the various methods of
mining in each of them, with the different qualities of the coal in various deposits, with
the various methods for utilizing the coal for the production of heat, power, and a great
number of derivatives.").
62. See supra note 41.
63. L. Mises, supra note 7, at 699.
Thomas Sowell, a supporter of the Austrian tradition, has noted that "the Soviet
machine tool industry alone produces about 125,000 products, involving an estimated
15,000,000,000 possible relations." T. Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions 220 (1980).
Sowell particularly emphasizes the problem of determining rates of substitution through
any nonmarket process, since these rates require a knowledge of "subjective patterns of
trade-off that are nowhere articulated, not even to the individual himself." Id. at 217-18
(emphasis omitted). Sowell offers the following example:
I might think that, if faced with the stark prospect of bankruptcy, I would
rather sell my automobile than my furniture, or sacrifice the refrigerator rather
than the stove, but unless and until such a moment comes, I will never know
even my own trade-offs, much less anybody else's. There is no way for such
information to be fed into a computer, when no one has such information in the
first place.
Id. at 218 (emphasis in original).
64. See Hayek I, supra note 5, at 526-27, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 86-87.
65. Id. at 526, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 86 ("We must look at the price
system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its
real function .... ").
66. See id. at 527, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 87 ("The marvel is that in a
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there were no market prices, some single mind would have to know the
concrete information on which efficiency depends.
Mises' principal argument is that large-scale economic planning is pos-
sible only because economic calculations based on prices are possible.67
For example, without such calculations it would be impossible for a cor-
poration, court or planning agency to choose rationally between two
technologically feasible methods of producing a product, one of which
employed inputs in quantities 10a + 86b + 31c + 80d + 41e + 8f +
90g and the other in quantities 27a + 1 lb + 90c + 30d + 60e + 1Of +
70g. Without the common denominator of money prices, one simply
cannot say which of the two (or, more likely, hundreds of) processes em-
ploys "less" of society's resources-imposes less cost in the form of valu-
able foregone alternatives-and is thus more efficient. As Mises stated:
"The paradox of 'planning' is that it cannot plan, because of the absence
of economic calculation. What is called a planned economy is no econ-
omy at all. It is just a system of groping around in the dark., 6 8
To summarize the Austrian argument, a market price embodies the
knowledge of vast numbers of people regarding available supplies of the
concrete good, its highly specific actual and potential resources and alter-
native uses of those resources, as well as the requirements for that good
and for its highly specific possible substitutes. The Austrians make no
assertion that market prices are the most efficient prices conceivable, but
however imperfect those prices are, they still embody wisdom many or-
ders of magnitude greater than any one mind could possess.69
B. The Growth of Knowledge and the Competitive Process
The previous section discussed the Austrian view that a core economic
problem is to find a way to make efficient use of the knowledge that al-
ready exists but only in a diffuse form among millions of people. Equally
important to the Austrian analysis is the importance of the growth of
case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without
more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people
whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the
material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction.").
67. L. Mises, supra note 7, at 700. If one mind could know simultaneously all ex-
isting production methods, all potential production methods and the relative importance
of all the different ends, the calculation problem might be soluble with the use of simulta-
neous equations. The problem is precisely that such data is diffuse, and that without
prices one who lacks substantially comprehensive knowledge cannot make efficient use of
the knowledge she does possess. For an excellent summary of the socialist calculation
debate, and a thorough demonstration that the Lange-Lerner trial-and-error approach
constitutes no solution once the dynamic characteristics of the market generate signifi-
cant changes that must be entrepreneurially predicted, see D. Lavoie, Rivalry and Cen-
tral Planning 125-32 (1985).
68. L. Mises, supra note 8, at 700.
69. See C. Menger, supra note 2, at 74; Hayek I, supra note 5, at 527-28, reprinted in
F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 88-89.
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knowledge beyond that which exists at any one point in time. ° The
static models of neoclassical economics assume away the important ele-
ment of time, and with it the problems of uncertainty and learning.7
The first illustration of this aspect of the Austrian critique, although per-
haps not one on which Austrian writers have been particularly clear or
consistent, concerns "economic man"-the ready-made figure assumed
in neoclassical models.72 It is true that the Austrian economists assume a
very thin conception of "rational" conduct that involves some element of
purposefulness,73 but the neoclassical conception of a human being as a
walking set of consistent indifference curves is rejected by the Austrian
school.
On the contrary, the Austrian school recognizes that people are not
necessarily "rational" in the sense assumed by neoclassical economists,
but rather that rationality is a trait one can learn (or unlearn) over time.
However, no guarantee exists that such learning will in fact take place, or
that people will not regress into irrationality. Nevertheless, the Austri-
70. See C. Menger, supra note 2, at 74; Hayek I, supra note 5, at 526-27, reprinted in
F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 86-87.
71. See supra text accompanying note 37. This is true even of neoclassical "compara-
five statics" models, which seek to compare two equally timeless stationary states. See G.
Shackle, supra note 7, at 271.
72. See supra note 36.
73. Rizzo, Mises and Lakatos: A Reformulation ofAustrian Methodology, in Austrian
Economics, supra note 3, at 57 ("The fundamental presupposition of Austrian economics
is that man acts or, equivalently, that he engages in purposeful behavior."); see L Mises,
supra note 7, at 355-56 ("the activities of enterprising men, the promoters and specula-
tors, eager to profit from discrepancies in the price structure, tend toward eradicating
such discrepancies").
Hayek has argued that the neoclassical assumption had not been made until the later
classical economists did so:
Even such a celebrated figment as the "economic man" was not an original part
of the British evolutionary tradition. It would be only a slight exaggeration to
say that, in the view of those British philosophers, man was by nature lazy and
indolent, improvident and wasteful, and that it was only by the force of circum-
stances that he could be made to behave economically or would learn carefully
to adjust his means to his ends. The homo oeconomicus was explicitly intro-
duced, with much else that belongs to the rationalist rather than to the evolu-
tionary tradition, only by the younger Mill.
F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 61 (1960).
Carl Menger also pointed out that the weakly assumed "rational" or "purposeful"
person was fully capable of conduct that in ordinary discourse might be considered
irrational:
Even individuals whose economic activity is conducted rationally, and who
therefore certainly endeavor to recognize the true importance of satisfactions in
order to gain an accurate foundation for their economic activity, are subject to
error. Error is inseparable from all human knowledge.
Men are especially prone to let themselves be misled into overestimating the
importance of satisfactions that give intense momentary pleasure but contribute
only fleetingly to their well-being, and so into underestimating the importance
of satisfactions on which a less intensive but longer enduring well-being
depends.
C. Menger, supra note 2, at 148.
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ans believe that individuals will become more rational over time if social
institutions allow them to experience the consequences of their economic
actions:
If we allow men freedom because we presume them to be reasonable
beings, we also must make it worth their while to act as reasonable
beings by letting them bear the consequences of their decisions....
The assigning of responsibility thus presupposes the capacity on men's
part for rational action, and it aims at making them act more rationally
than they would otherwise. It presupposes a certain minimum capac-
ity in them for learning and foresight, for being guided by a knowledge
of the consequences of their action. It is no objection to argue that
reason in fact plays only a small part in determining human action,
since the aim is to make that little go as far as possible.74
A second illustration of the neoclassical tendency to ignore the dy-
namic effects of time is their neglect of entrepreneurship.7" The simplest
idea embodied in the concept of entrepreneurship is that of arbitrage-
perceiving that different prices for the "same good" exist in different
places and engaging in an essentially instantaneous transfer.76 Thus the
neoclassical assumption that the price is everywhere the same for the
same good is in the Austrian scheme not an assumption but a tendency of
a market process.77 In other words, the market system provides an in-
centive for individuals to make the condition increasingly true over
time.78
74. F. Hayek, supra note 73, at 76-77. Thomas Sowell's recent critique of Marxism
stresses its failure to appreciate this feature of the market economy, see T. Sowell, Marx-
ism 190 (1985) ("As a theoretical system, Marxian economics begins the story of produc-
tion in the middle-with firms, capital, and management already in existence somehow,
and needing only the addition of labor to get production started. From that point on,
output is a function of labor input, given all the other factors somehow already assembled,
coordinated, and directed toward a particular economic purpose.") (emphasis in origi-
nal); but this is a failure that Marxism shares with mainstream neoclassical theory.
Kirzner attributes the neoclassical neglect of the entrepreneurial role to its "preoccupa-
tion with final equilibrium positions." Kirzner, supra note 3, at 4. The Austrian entre-
preneur is not the technological inventor of Schumpeter's conception; she is not the party
who causes the supply curves to shift, but the party who realizes that they have shifted.
Id.
75. See I. Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity and Profit 53 (1979) ("It is by now fairly
well recognized that the mainstream of [neoclassical] microeconomics has, particularly
since its decisive absorption of Walrasian influence, assumed a form in which scope for
the entrepreneurial role is conspicuous by its absence.").
76. Leff, The LeffDictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J. 1855, 2050-51 (1985).
77. See L. Mises, supra note 7, at 355-56 ("[T]he activities of enterprising men ...
tend toward eradicating ... discrepancies [in the market] and thereby also toward blot-
ting out the sources of entrepreneurial profit and loss. [The economist] shows how this
process would finally result in the establishment of [market equilibrium]."); Hayek II,
supra note 5, at 44, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 45 (a tendency toward equilib-
rium "can hardly mean anything but that, under certain conditions, the knowledge and
intentions of the different members of society are supposed to come more and more into
agreement").
78. In this connection, it is important to note the essentially subjective character of a
"good" in the Austrian (and, for that matter, in the neoclassical) conception. See C.
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In addition, the role of the entrepreneur goes beyond low-risk, virtu-
ally instantaneous arbitrage. Entrepreneurial profit can be earned by
perceiving lines of investment where market prices are in dis-
equilibrium 79-where the entrepreneur judges that the expected selling
price of a product she can offer for sale in the future will more than cover
the present costs of producing the product.80 Thus, the entrepreneur's
most important functions, which neoclassical economics overlooks be-
cause it generally neglects the time element, are to perceive present mar-
ket conditions, imagine alternative future market conditions, make
judgments about the existence of likely incongruities in the market over
time and create futures that exploit (and, in the process, mitigate) those
incongruities.81 It does not "just happen" that factories are built that five
years later produce products consumers want to buy at a profit to the
manufacturer.
The lack of a role for entrepreneurship in the neoclassical theory of
competition and the market is an aspect of the more general Austrian
Menger, supra note 2, at 52. The same physical item-a block of ice or a load of ce-
ment-may be a totally different good, depending on whether it is winter or summer and
how far the good is from the people who need it. The market system rewards equaliza-
tion of the price of each "good" subjectively defined. Thomas Sowell has written:
[I]t may be apparent that a given physical object has a value that varies greatly
according to the location of that object in time and space, and according to the
risks associated with it. Otherwise people would not go to the trouble and ex-
pense of transporting things, or insuring them, or buying them on credit with
interest charges. Indeed, no exchanges of goods (for other goods or for money)
would ever take place, unless the same physical things had different values to
different people. Yet the opposite view-that a given physical object is always a
given value-has had a profound effect on human history. Over the centuries,
highly diverse consequences have followed from a belief in the invariable value
of a physical object-a belief that can be characterized as "the physical fallacy."
T. Sowell, supra note 63, at 67.
The problem is that individuals not subject to the incentives of the market process,
such as judges, may be tempted to see inefficiencies wherever the same physical item sells
for different prices in different places or times. For example, the middleman in a transac-
tion is commonly seen to be cheating people because he buys goods for one price and sells
them at a higher price. See id. at 68. This recurrent difficulty with intervention is ex-
plored in infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
80. See High, Alertness and Judgment: Comment on Kirzner, in Austrian Economics,
supra note 3, at 161; Kirzner, Uncertainty, Discovery, and Human Action: A Study of the
Entrepreneurial Profile of the Misesian System, in Austrian Economics, supra note 3, at
141.
81. For example, the entrepreneur may take advantage of an existing monopoly con-
dition. According to one Austrian interpretation, "[a]ll markets begin with monopoly
and move toward being more and more competitive." O'Driscoll, Monopoly in Theory
and Practice, in Austrian Economics, supra note 3, at 207. Profit opportunities exist
initially in starting a new market, such as for a new or differentiated product or a new
productive process. Once others discover the market, profit opportunities exist in imitat-
ing the newly proven process without charging as high a price: "The monopolist's very
method of exploiting his power-undersupplying the market-is the source of his own
demise." Id. Of course, long before monopoly profits could be totally eroded and "per-
fect competition" reestablished, it is likely that someone will create yet another product
that can for a time be monopolized. See L. Lachmann, supra note 7, at 145.
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critique. The Austrian school economist Israel Kirzner describes this
point:
A characteristic feature of the Austrian approach to economic theory
is its emphasis on the market as a process, rather than as a configura-
tion of prices, qualities, and quantities that are consistent with each
other in that they produce a market equilibrium situation. This feature
of Austrian economics is closely bound up with dissatisfaction with the
general use made of the concept of perfect competition. 82
For example, neoclassical economics assumes that costs are "given,"
and thus that one can state meaningfully whether a firm is producing
above or below marginal cost.83 To the Austrians, it is only through the
market process of persistent searching by individuals for low-cost meth-
ods of production that such data can be discovered.84 Neoclassical eco-
nomics assumes that goods are homogeneous, when in fact it is only
through persistent attempts to "improve" or "differentiate" a product
that one specific version of the product comes to occupy most of the mar-
ket.85 The perfect competition model of neoclassical economics assumes
away all personal relationships 6 and thus misses the central importance
of the development of reputations or goodwill on the part of people who
provide services about which uninformed consumers know they are igno-
rant.87 Finally, the static models of neoclassical economics see no solu-
tion to monopoly except to posit the empirically problematic assertion
that expanding firms will eventually encounter diseconomies of scale.88
Austrian economists see monopoly or oligopoly in an open economy as
an important stage in a process of learning and adaptation. They trust
the competitive process to minimize monopolistic abuses over time, be-
cause the driving forces of the learning process are the entrepreneurial
82. See I. Kirzner, supra note 75, at 3-5 (emphasis in original).
83. See supra text accompanying note 37.
84. See Address by Hayek, The Meaning of Competition (May 20, 1946), reprinted in
F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 95-96; Kirzner, supra note 80, at 141.
85. See Address by Hayek, supra note 84, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 96.
86. See G. Stigler, The Theory of Competitive Price 24 (1942) ("Economic relation-
ships are never perfectly competitive if they involve any personal relationship between
economic units.").
87. See Address by Hayek, supra note 84, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 97
("[Clompetition is in a large measure competition for reputation or good will.... The
function of competition is here precisely to teach us who will serve us well: which grocer
or travel agency, which department store or hotel, which doctor or solicitor .. ") (em-
phasis in original).
88. Austrian economists do not deny that it is possible for a market to exist with
minimal prospects for the development of substitute or differentiated products, better
technological processes or cost-saving insights, and that such a market might be charac-
terized by a technology that could produce a natural monopoly. See L. Lachmann, supra
note 7, at 144 ("It has always been known that perfect competition is incompatible with
increasing returns."). However, neoclassical economists place their principal hope for
competition on the empirically problematic assertion, see F. Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 86 (1980), that diseconomies of scale will cause
marginal costs to begin to rise as the firm becomes larger, see E. Mansfield, supra note 37,
at 187.
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talents and knowledge that themselves are so difficult to monopolize.8 9
C. The Methodology of the Austrian School
As noted earlier, neoclassical economists do not contend that the as-
sumptions of their models, about which the Austrians are so critical, are
realistic, but rather that they help predict and explain reality. 9° Accord-
ingly, much of the Austrian critique is methodological. The Austrian
school of economics is committed to the principle of methodological in-
dividualism. As stated by the Austrian school economist Ludwig Lach-
mann: "Methodological individualism... means simply that we shall
not be satisfied with any type of explanation of social phenomena which
does not lead us ultimately to a human plan."9' Note what is not implied
by this methodology. It is emphatically not a "conspiracy" theory be-
cause social phenomena are often the unintended effects of the interac-
tion of numerous individual plans.92 Nor does it suggest that individual
plans themselves are not influenced or even determined by other social
phenomena or that the autonomous individual is in any sense prior to the
social system.93 Indeed, Hayek has devoted a large part of his later work
to refuting the argument that human values and reason are independent
of the social process.94 Nevertheless, the Austrians insist that complex
social phenomena must somehow be traced to their probable sources in
individual human minds, whether or not further analysis could explain
certain aspects of the minds themselves.95
This methodological approach leads the Austrians to differ sharply
with Milton Friedman's view that the goal of economics is to construct
89. See L. Lachmarm, supra note 7, at 145.
90. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
91. L. Lachmann, supra note 7, at 154.
92. For an example of the problem with conspiracy theory, see T. Sowell, supra note
63, at 196.
93. See Address by Hayek, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals--A Problem for
Science (November 1, 1983), reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 59, at 318-19.
It is particularly important to note this fact because the Institutional school of econom-
ics has used the contrary view as a straw man in its criticism of mainstream, and, by
implication, Austrian, economics. See Dugger, Methodological Differences Between Insti-
tutional and Neoclassical Economics, in The Philosophy of Economics, supra note 24, at
314-15.
94. See, e.g., F. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science 34 (1952); Address by
Hayek, supra note 93, reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 59, at 318-19.
95. This methodological individualism is mandated by the nature of the social sci-
ences. Social science-a study of regularities in social phenomena-is possible only so far
as one can understand, through introspection and empathy, the meaning that individuals
attach to particular phenomena. See L. Lachmann, The Legacy of Max Weber 31 (1971).
Austrian economics opposes attempts to establish that social "wholes" exhibit regulari-
ties independent from any plausible conception of individual values and knowledge. See
id. Wholes are sufficiently complex that their direct study can mislead. For example,
observation may show the price of farmland relative to urban real estate values declining
over a certain period of time, but many thousands of influences may be responsible for
this, any one of which may be absent in a future period. Only patient reconstruction of
the individual elements that combine to determine prices can lead to an explanation.
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theories that produce verifiable predictions from admittedly false prem-
ises.96 Indeed, some Austrian school economists-notably Ludwig Mises
and Murray Rothbard-take the diametrically opposed view that the
laws of economics follow deductively from the true premise that people
act purposefully.97 They contend that if the conclusions of economic
models are the products of sound logical deductions from incontestable
premises, those conclusions must be true and cannot be contradicted by
experience. 98
Although this contention may go too far for most Austrian school
economists,99 it does illustrate the conflict between Milton Friedman's
position on the relative importance of realistic assumptions and predic-
tive power in economic models and the corresponding Austrian view.
The conflict, however, should not be overstated. The Austrians do not
believe that the individual human beings of their models must possess all
the richness of a real human personality. Disregard of the traits that are
not expected to influence economic decisions in any major or systematic
way is appropriate in the interest of manageable theory construction. l°
The Austrian approach leads to a theory of logical deduction from
simple and hard-to-contest premises about individual economic actors
with limited knowledge, but one that fails to predict quantitative conclu-
sions of the kind policy makers often want.'0 1 The Austrian theorists
criticize the overly mathematical character of neoclassical economics, in
particular its pretense of giving quantitative conclusions that are in fact
beyond the competence of social science.10 2 The result is too often that
regularities are accepted because they are quantifiable rather than be-
cause they can be defended as theoretically sound, deriving ultimately
from intelligible human plans. 103
III. AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND CONTRACT LAW
The Austrian critique of neoclassical economics, if accepted, tends to
96. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
97. See L. Mises, supra note 8, at 38-44; 1 M. Rothbard, supra note 7, at 9.
98. See L. Mises, supra note 8, at 38-44; 1 M. Rothbard, supra note 7, at 9.
99. See Rizzo, supra note 73, at 64-65 (observations may disprove premises).
100. In choosing which traits to disregard, experience is an important guide. For ex-
ample, a failure of rent controls strictly enforced for ten years to produce a shortage of
housing in one city might be explainable, but a repeated failure of such shortages to
appear would suggest that something is probably wrong with either the assumptions or
the logic of the model. See Address of Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge (Dec. 11,
1974), reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 59, at 268-69.
101. See id., reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 59, at 269-70.
102. See id., reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 59, at 571. Quantitatively
precise predictions would require perfect foresight, and an assertion that the scientist can
know all the causes of a person's behavior in advance. See G. Shackle, supra note 7, at
349-51.
103. The Austrians are thus particularly critical of macroeconomic "theories" like the
Phillips Curve, which derive from quantitative observations of inflation and unemploy-
ment rates over time rather than from microeconomic foundations. See Address of
Hayek, supra note 100, reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 59, at 267-72.
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alter the raison d'etre of the free market and freedom of contract. In
general terms, freedom of contract is no longer defended because it pro-
duces perfect efficiency. Rather, freedom of contract produces more effi-
cient outcomes than does judicial or legislative intervention, and
outcomes that are increasingly efficient over time. This general point can
be illustrated with the specific contract ideas of impossibility, mistake
and unconscionability.
A. Impossibility and Mistake
1. Impossibility and the Entrepreneur
Under section 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, a party's
performance under a contract will be excused if such performance "is
made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made," unless the language of the contract or the circumstances in-
dicate that he assumed the risk of the occurrence of the event. o The
issue considered here is whether and under what circumstances the dis-
charge of a contract on the ground of impracticability is efficient.
The doctrine of impossibility does not arise if the parties agreed that
one party would assume a risk, but only when the risk is unforeseen or
unprovided for.105 Unfortunately, contracting parties are often not clear
about their intentions, and the contract may simply fix some terms, say-
ing nothing about whether the contract will remain enforceable given
various contingencies. When parties are silent about the allocation of
specific risks, Professors Posner and Rosenfield have argued that the
court should allocate the risk to the superior ex ante risk-bearer.I 6 If the
risk were preventable, the better risk-bearer might be the party who was
better able to prevent the risk from occurring. 07 But even if neither
party could have prevented the risk, one party may still be the better
risk-bearer because she was better able to insure against the risk, either
by buying market insurance or by self-insuring.00 The party who could
have better insured against the risk may be the one who could have better
estimated the probability and impact of the loss or it may be the one who
had greater ability to diversify away a known risk." 9
From the point of view of the Austrian school, the Posner and Rosen-
104. Second Restatement, supra note 9, § 261 & comment C.
105. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 90, reprinted in The Economics of Con-
tract Law, supra note 1, at 122-23 ("Of course, if the parties have expressly assigned the
risk to one of them, there is no occasion to inquire which is the superior risk bearer.").
106. See id, reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 1, at 122.
107. Id, reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 1, at 123.
108. Id. at 90-91, reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 1, at 123
("The promisor may be the superior insurer. If so, his inability to prevent the risk from
materializing should not operate to discharge him from the contract, any more than an
insurance company's inability to prevent a fire on the premises of the insured should
excuse it from its liability to make good the damage caused by the fire.").
109. Id. at 92, reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 1, at 124-25.
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field analysis fails to recognize the phenomenon of entrepreneurship.
Posner and Rosenfield consider the impossibility problem to arise when
an unprovided-for contingency makes performance uneconomical. "0
This problem, however, could develop in at least three different ways:
1. The parties both assumed that the risk would not arise, and no
entrepreneurial perceptiveness reasonably could have contradicted
either party's assumption;
2. One party's lack of entrepreneurial perceptiveness caused her to
assume the risk would not arise, while the other's entrepreneurial
perceptiveness caused her to realize that it might in fact arise;
3. The parties both assumed the risk would not arise, but en-
trepreneurial perceptiveness on the part of one or both parties rea-
sonably could have contradicted that party's assumption.
Austrian economics might have very little to contribute to resolving a
case such as Taylor v. Caldwell,1 ' which involved the question of
whether a contract to lease a music hall was discharged when the music
hall burned to the ground.' 12 The case falls within the first category
listed above; although a fire is perhaps not utterly unforeseeable, it is
surely difficult to attribute the loss to any reasonable conception of lack
of entrepreneurial perceptiveness. But suppose that the problem is that
costs in a particular industry have risen by fifty-eight percent. "1 3 When a
change of this nature causes one party to suffer losses and the other to
reap gains, the question of which of the three categories of interpretation
explains the parties' failure to allocate the risk may become important.
To an Austrian economist, entrepreneurial judgment and perceptiveness
concerning costs are important, because they are a necessary precondi-
tion for efficient resource allocation.1 '4 To allow a party to escape per-
formance under a contract because she failed to foresee a rise in costs
when the other party did fails to compensate the knowledgeable party for
perceptiveness. Such perceptiveness and judgment do not occur by acci-
dent; they occur only because those who fail to perceive the economic
situation suffer the consequences of their failure, I while those who do
110. Id. at 90, reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note I, at 122.
111. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
112. See id. at 312.
113. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 139-40 (W.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
911 (1980).
114. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
115. It would be a mistake to regard the idea of "entrepreneurial perceptiveness" as an
all-or-nothing state of mind that a contracting party either possesses in full or lacks en-
tirely. For example, neither party may have believed costs would rise 58%, but if party A
believed that they would fall by 10% while party B judged that they would rise by 20%,
A inhibits and B advances efficient resource allocation.
This is not an assertion of blameworthiness or fault on A's part. In this context, entre-
preneurship is no different than other inputs; rewarding naturally gifted restaurant chefs,
for example, contributes to efficient resource allocation as well, but this is certainly not a
commentary on the moral worth of inferior chefs. See Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism,
Equality, and Justice, 2 Soc. Phil. & Policy 115, 124 (1985).
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perceive it reap the benefits of their entrepreneurial judgment.'" 6
The Austrian theory of impossibility clearly conflicts with that of Pos-
ner and Rosenfield. Those two authors argue that when a contract be-
comes uneconomical because of the occurrence of some event, the loss
should be placed on the party who ex ante was better able to foresee and
insure against that risk. I 7 Posner and Rosenfield presumably would re-
gard proof that one party in fact did perceive the risk as damning evi-
dence that the party was in a better position to reduce the risk by
insurance or otherwise.11 Moreover, the idea of placing the risk on the
better risk-spreader implies that the party who accurately perceived some
incongruity will be deprived of the fruits of that perception if she is capa-
ble of diversifying away some of the other party's loss. 119 This clearly is
not a theory calculated to encourage entrepreneurship, and Austrian
economists would sympathize with it only in cases like Taylor v. Caldwell
where entrepreneurial activity plays a minor role.
Indeed, further analysis shows that the entire Austrian conception of
contract differs from that of neoclassical economists. Professors
Kronman and Posner believe the justification for contracts is that both
parties ex ante benefit from them.'20 A mistake or subsequent change in
circumstances may destroy that mutual benefit, and any such result
should, according to Kronman and Posner, be rectified by allocating the
risk of that mistake or subsequent change to the party to whom it would
have been allocated if both parties had been fully perceptive and in-
formed.1 ' The Austrians, by contrast, regard entrepreneurial percep-
tiveness as an essential skill to be encouraged, and their defense of
contract is not that both parties necessarily benefit ex ante from every
contract but that over the long run the system of contracting encourages
the full use of human knowledge.' 22
116. See supra note 72.
117. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
118. It is true that Posner and Rosenfield disclaim interest in the question of which
party is in a better position ex post to bear the loss, as opposed to which party ex ante
could have better prevented it. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 113, reprinted
in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 1, at 135-36. Logically, therefore, Posner
and Rosenfield should not want to punish the party who did in fact perceive the risk, but
the party who was ex ante in a better position to do so. Posner and Rosenfield, however,
do not discuss the problem of entrepreneurial perception, and it does not seem that liti-
gants in an impossibility case before Judge Posner would be well-advised to deny that
they were in a position to exercise entrepreneurial judgment.
119. Id. at 106, reprinted in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 1, at 130-31.
120. See Kronman & Posner, supra note 1, at 1-3.
121. See id. at 4 ("An important function of contract law is to enforce the parties"
agreed-upon allocation of risk. A related function is to reduce the costs of the exchange
process by supplying a standard set of risk-allocation terms for use by contracting par-
ties.... If the parties are satisfied with the way in which the rule allocates the risk of that
contingency, they have no need to incur the expense of writing their own risk-allocation
rule into the contract.").
122. See I. Kirzner, supra note 75, at 215-17.
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2. Duty to Disclose Knowledge
Professor Kronman has discussed the question of whether a con-
tracting party who possesses some factual knowledge unavailable to the
other party is under a duty to disclose it before contracting., 23 He con-
cludes that such a duty should not be imposed if that knowledge were
acquired through deliberate and costly effort, because those efforts must
be encouraged. 124 If the knowledge was acquired without such a con-
scious effort, however, Kronman suggests that the law should imply a
duty to disclose the factual information. 125
Entrepreneurship does not, however, involve merely incurring the
costs of becoming informed; it also involves perceiving opportunities for
useful knowledge acquisition, knowledge that may itself be inexpensive to
acquire once one realizes that acquiring it is valuable. 126 Moreover, the
entrepreneur may acquire all her facts by casual means, but be able to use
those facts to form creative insights that others lacking entrepreneurial
judgment would not have had. 127 Alertness, imagination, creativity and
judgment are far from being ubiquitous human traits, and it is arbitrary
to reward such eminently useful economic skills only when by coinci-
dence they happen to be coupled with highly costly acquisitions of
knowledge.
Thus, an Austrian perspective on the problem of disclosure of facts
and the defense of mistake requires that the phenomenon of entrepre-
neurship be taken seriously. The question becomes whether there are
any circumstances in which gains from entrepreneurial perceptiveness
should be confiscated by use of the doctrines of mistake or impossibility.
In the "leading" case of Laidlaw v. Organ,2 8 only one party to a tobacco
123. See Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
Legal Stud. 1 (1978). This problem is often discussed under the rubric of the defense of
mistake.
124. See id. at 33.
125. See id.
Although Kronman's theory concerns the doctrine of mistake rather than impossibil-
ity, the same considerations apply when one party accurately perceived a future develop-
ment but elected not to disclose the forecast before contracting. Indeed, with regard to
the factor of entrepreneurship considered here, the doctrines of mistake and impossibility
can be considered together, because both concepts involve an attempt by one party to
excuse herself from a contractual duty by citing her failure to perceive some fact which
was a basic assumption upon which she contracted. Compare Second Restatement, supra
note 9, § 153 (rule regarding mistake) with id, § 261 (rule regarding impossibility).
126. See I. Kirzner, supra note 75, at 32.
127. See High, supra note 80, at 167. High criticized Kirzner's early work for limiting
the entrepreneurial role to one of alertness, ignoring the problem of uncertainty about the
future. Kirzner answered by including within the idea of alertness the alertness to cir-
cumstances that might suggest future changes. See Kirzner, supra note 80, at 148-51.
High replies that this conception of entrepreneurship is still too narrow since it ignores
the need for judgment: "Alertness is the mental quality of being on the lookout for some-
thing new; judgment is the mental process of assigning relevance to those things we al-
ready know." High, supra note 80, at 167.
128. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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contract was aware that a peace treaty had just been signed ending the
War of 1812 and with it the naval blockade that was holding down the
market price of tobacco.129 In holding that the knowledgeable party was
not required to disclose this information, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic cir-
cumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and
which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to
have been communicated by him to the vendor? The court is of opin-
ion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to
circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the
means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the
same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending
to impose upon the other.13
0
Consistent with his analysis of the need to reward costly searches for
information, Professor Kronman argues that the question of whether the
contract in Laidlaw should have been discharged turns on whether the
knowledgeable party acquired news of the treaty as a result of a deliber-
ate (and therefore presumably costly) search for such news.' However,
in Laidlaw another consideration seems much more important. The
problem in this case is that information about the treaty, whether or not
deliberately obtained, was certain to reach the market very soon, proba-
bly within hours. The question thus is whether the marginal encourage-
ment to entrepreneurial skills of this character is important enough to
outweigh the static effect of locking in a tobacco contract at an unrealis-
tic price.132 The Austrian perspective is sympathetic with Justice Mar-
shall's fear that courts might be unable to identify cases in which
information was entrepreneurially significant, and thus the result may be
defensible because of the need for a manageable bright-line test. Never-
theless, the case does present a particularly compelling fact situation for
considering the entrepreneurial element a matter of secondary
importance.
It would appear, moreover, that the case for enforcement of the con-
tract in Laidlaw v. Organ would have been much stronger under facts
different than those Kronman considers vital. Suppose, for example,
that six months prior to the end of the war, the party in Laidlaw had a
personal conversation with a friend, during which the friend, who was
familiar with the treaty negotiations, told the party that the war should
end within the year. Although the party made no deliberate search for
that information, suppose further that the party perceived that the end of
the war would raise the price of tobacco, and accordingly began entering
129. See id. at 183.
130. Id. at 195 (dictum).
131. See Kronman, supra note 123, at 15-16, reprinted in The Economics of Contract
Law, supra note 1, at 119-20.
132. In other markets, such as that for securities, "beating the market" by minutes or
hours may be an important market function, but the reward of entrepreneurship arises
from the repeated character of such revaluations.
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long-term purchase contracts. These contracts should not be dischargea-
ble when the war ends; the expectation of such a holding would discour-
age potentially perceptive parties from acting on their perceptions by
buying and thus moving the market price in the correct direction-in
this case, upward.
Thus, the Austrian theory does not argue for complete abolition of the
contract defenses of mistake and impossibility. In some cases, the contri-
bution to the process of developing entrepreneurship may be sufficiently
slight to warrant discharge. Nevertheless, the Austrian theory does sug-
gest that there is considerable merit to Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in
Laidlaw, even if the facts of the case may present one of the rare in-
stances in which that dictum was not applicable.
Undoubtedly there is an intuition that someone who profits because
she perceives a better use for the owner's property than the owner herself
perceives, but chooses not to tell the owner that better use prior to
purchasing the property, is behaving less than honorably. Yet the ques-
tion remains whether contract law is going to regard entrepreneurship as
a ready-made gift from the Heavens or as a factor of production that
must command a price. To the Austrians, conduct of this character is
not fraud, but is rather creation of value, because the same physical item
may have much greater value in the hands of one who perceives a use for
it than in the hands of one who does not.
133
B. Standard Form Contracts
One of the embarrassments to the ideal of freedom of contract is the
omnipresent standard form. 134 Ironically, as numerous authors have
noted, the phenomenon of standard forms also can be viewed as the
product of failing to adhere to the principles of freedom of contract. 135
After all, the law for some reason has chosen to give legal force to terms
on which it cannot be said either that the parties' minds subjectively met
or that a reasonable objective third party would have believed those
minds had met. 136 Because this conclusion may be controversial where
both parties are commercial institutions that may employ their own
forms, the analysis here will be limited to the noncommercial context
where one party employs a standard form to which the other is expected
to assent if she wants the transaction to take place.
The view that standard forms manifest freedom of contract rather than
133. See I. Kirzner, supra note 75, at 216-17.
134. See Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contract Law
by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 28-29 (1984).
135. See, e.g., Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 1174, 1180-83 (1983); Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4, 11 (1974). See generally Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-
Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & Econ. 461 (1974).
136. See Slawson, supra note 134, at 27 ("businesses know full well that their forms
will not generally be read, let alone understood").
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violate it may derive from a tendency to view the market as a particular
set of institutions. For example, Professor Rakoff backs away from advo-
cating the wholesale invalidation of invisible standard form clauses be-
cause he fears the loss of autonomy by independent institutions."3 7 The
Austrian conception of the market as a process, rather than any particu-
lar set of institutions, requires that an institution continue to prove itself
against alternative institutions under the market process. 38
As noted earlier, the Austrians tend to regard market prices as embod-
ying vast amounts of highly diffuse knowledge about relative scarcities
that is unavailable to any one particular source such as a court. 3 9 Such
supraindividual wisdom, however, certainly cannot be claimed for con-
tract terms conceived by one party, drafted to the limit of the allowable
law and slipped past numerous parties on the other side who could not
justify the time it would take them to review the document carefully. In
the language of efficiency, consumers have difficulty making their "mar-
ginal rates of substitution" between any two products equal to the "price
ratio," 4 because they cannot figure out the "prices" of those products-
the contractual terms on which the products are offered. The Austrian
perspective, therefore, disfavors the enforcement of the invisible terms in
standard forms, at least in the context of transactions involving individ-
ual consumers.
Having said this, however, it does not follow that nothing could be
worse than standard forms. The temptation is to exaggerate the harm
done by standard forms in the interest of promoting a desirable reform in
the law of contracts. The risk of this approach, however, is that one may
come to see any system that allows contractual freedom by weak parties
as partaking somewhat of the problems of standard forms, and conclude
that the safe course, at least for terms other than price, is to make all
duties nondisclaimable.14 ' From the perspective of the Austrian school,
this would be a serious mistake.
As examples of the tendency to exaggerate the harm done by standard
forms, one can cite passages from the otherwise outstanding contribu-
tions to the subject by Professors Slawson and Rakoff. Slawson, for ex-
ample, has stated:
The mass contractor has been put in the position of setting the terms of
137. See Rakoff, supra note 135, at 1242-43.
138. See T. Sowell, supra note 63, at 41.
139. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
140. See C. Ferguson & J. Gould, supra note 41, at 453 (Efficiency requires that all
consumers set their marginal rate of substitution between any two commodities equal to
the marginal rates of other consumers, so that all consumers at the margin, say, would be
willing to part with their last steak in return for two additional pounds of hamburger.
This is because if their marginal rates differed, an exchange could make them both better
off. Perfect competition achieves this result by use of a uniform price ratio that all con-
sumers set equal to their marginal rate of substitution.).
141. For a ringing defense of nondisclaimable duties that does not seem to exempt even
price terms from its enthusiasm, see Kennedy, supra note 42, at 64849.
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what we may still call a contract essentially as he may please. The
only limitation on his power presently is the minor and practically in-
effectual limitation placed on it by the courts. . . . The limitation
which used to exist by virtue of the consumer's ability to refuse to
contract on terms to which he did not consent has been lost.
142
Slawson then estimates that in one industry in one state alone-insurance
in California-consumers are being overcharged hundreds of millions of
dollars per year in this manner.
14 3
Professor Rakoff presents the problem in equally stark terms:
When contracts of adhesion become commonplace, even the individual
who reads and understands is, and may well perceive himself to be,
essentially helpless. The consumer's experience of modem commercial
life is one not of freedom in the full sense posited by traditional con-
tract law, but rather one of submission to organizational domination,
leavened by the ability to choose the organization by which he will be
dominated. 144
To an Austrian school economist, these passages lack an appreciation
of goodwill.1 45 Once one leaves the neoclassical world where human be-
ings and human relations are absent, competition becomes very largely a
matter of competition among people. 146 Consumers are probably quite
ignorant of the terms of each standard form, but at the same time they
are reasonably likely to know they are ignorant.'4 7 Such knowledge
makes contracting with strangers or with people who try to overreach at
every available opportunity highly risky, and if consumers are risk-averse
they will demand risk premiums to compensate for that risk. 148 Avoid-
ing those risk premiums becomes an incentive to develop a reputation for
trustworthiness.
Given the serious imperfections in the market for consumer informa-
tion about the users of standard forms, the constraint of reputation is
hardly enough to undo all the harm of standard forms. ' 49 Nevertheless,
the idea that the mass contractor can impose terms (not simply put them
into a document but insist on them in disputes with the consumer) "es-
sentially as he may please" even if the consumer feels a "helpless" victim
of "organizational domination" would surely surprise many experienced
142. Slawson, supra note 134, at 53.
143. Id. at 1. Although it is not clear, this figure may include losses from inadequate
damage measures as well as harsh standard form terms. See id.
144. Rakoff, supra note 135, at 1229 (footnote omitted).
145. In fairness, Rakoff does acknowledge this phenomenon, and Slawson may as well,
but is not clear how that acknowledgement squares with the statements quoted in the
text. See id. at 1228 ("businessmen concerned with fostering goodwill do not always
stand on a document that was from the beginning overdrafted by lawyers").
146. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
147. See Gerner & Bryant, Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?, 15 J. Consumer
Af. 75, 78-79 (1981).
148. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 75 (2d ed. 1977).
149. See Goldberg, supra note 135, at 485-86.
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businesspeople. 5 ° To whatever extent goodwill does operate, moreover,
its effects will tend to be systematic rather than random. The worst gen-
erators of bad will presumably would be those clauses that surprise and
seriously disappoint the consumer. Particularly vulnerable would be the
most inefficient clauses-those that impose large burdens on the con-
sumer with little corresponding benefit to the producer. s5
Finally, the Austrian economists would stress that the profit opportu-
nities generated by harsh form clauses provide an incentive for entrepre-
neurs to enter the market and thereby depress prices.' 5 2 Such
entrepreneurial activity also would not eliminate the harm of standard
forms, because better informed consumers might prefer a contractual
package consisting of higher prices but more favorable additional
terms. 153 Nevertheless, any assertion that harsh form clauses are costing
consumers "hundreds of millions" of dollars must consider as an offset to
such losses the gains consumers receive in the form of lower prices.
As noted above, these observations are emphatically not intended as a
defense of standard forms in the consumer context." Rather, they are
intended to place the problem in perspective, so that remedial cures are
not worse than the disease. The next section of this Article discuss the
serious problems that Austrian economists see in the use of nondisclaim-
able duties.155 The remainder of this section is concerned with the ques-
tion of how the problem of the standard form might be remedied wvithout
using such nondisclaimable duties.
In the discussion of impossibility, the Austrian perspective was a
rather hard-boiled view that people learn important lessons from their
inaccurate entrepreneurial judgment.'5 6 But no such harshness is justi-
fied here. The market process requires that parties be aware of the terms
on which they are contracting. Professor Unger has drawn the impor-
tant distinction:
The problem arises constantly from an ambiguity in the expectancies
that contract law is supposed to protect: the expectancy may be an
150. See R. Posner, supra note 148, at 66-67 (concern for reputation would protect
voluntary exchange system in absence of contract).
151. See id. at 86-88. This is true even if the seller were a monopolist, because both the
monopolist and the fully informed consumer would benefit by removing the senseless,
inefficient clause and adjusting the price term accordingly. See Kennedy, supra note 42,
at 608.
152. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
153. See Rakoff, supra note 135, at 1227-31.
154. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
In the commercial context, a strong argument has been made for the enforcement of
form terms even when one of the entities was unaware of the form clauses. In such a
context, the standardized terms that come to prevail from general alertness to contract
clauses are likely to be more efficient than terms a court might itself impose "off the
rack." See Baird & Weisberg, Rules; Standards, and the Battle of the Forms:" A Reassess-
ment of§ 2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217, 1249-51 (1982).
155. See infra Part III.C.
156. See supra Part III.A.
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interest either in a certain performance or in the exchange value that
this performance embodies. Even when the performance consists in a
payment of money, the ambiguity does not disappear. Money itself
matters for its value in exchange, and this value may be subject to
radical and unexpected dislocations.
1 57
The Austrian perspective inclines strongly toward protecting only the
expectancy of a certain performance, recognizing both that the value of
that performance depends on information about alternatives to which
only an individual is privy 5 ' and that efficiency requires that individuals
learn the value of their actions.' 59 Ignorance of the external world and
ignorance of contract terms, however, are two very different problems-
the former is an inherent problem that any economic system must try to
alleviate while the latter becomes a problem only when the legal system
has chosen to give effect to unseen contract terms.' 60
Thus, while the Austrian view of impossibility is that ignorance and
entrepreneurial passivity regarding the outside world should be discour-
aged, in the area of standard contracts it is only when there is knowledge
together with active "entrepreneurial" judgment that the legal system
should recognize contractual terms as binding. The sphere of binding
terms in any contract, for example, would include the core "reasonable
expectations" of the consumer regarding the deal she has struck.' 6' In
addition to these core terms, it might be reasonable to expect consumers
to read and appreciate a small number of plainly visible, comprehensible
contract clauses that modify or limit those core terms.
Beyond this the contract should include enforceable terms only when
the consumer makes an active "entrepreneurial" choice in deciding to
include the terms. Experience suggests that merely making certain terms
conspicuous or forcing consumers to separately sign a long document in
numerous places accomplishes very little in making consent real. 162 By
contrast, when consumers are forced to make active judgments ("Do you
want this note to be at 121/s% interest with a $1000 penalty for prepay-
ment or at 131/8% with no penalty for prepayment?"), provided the
number of judgments is not so large as to be bewildering, the assumption
of consent seems more realistic. As the next section of this Article indi-
cates, the risk of imposing seriously mistaken nondisclaimable duties is
sufficiently large that a court should be extremely hesitant to invalidate
157. Unger, supra note 50, at 627-28.
158. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
160. This is not to say that the ideas of a "duty to read" or of the objective theory of
contracts should play no role in contract law; undoubtedly the other party should be
expected to have read at least a few core terms. The problem is that traditional contract
law has drawn the duty to read far too broadly.
161. For the interesting perspective that reasonable expectations are the contract, see
Slawson, supra note 134, at 23. As the text notes, however, the Austrians would be in-
clined not to construe "reasonable expectations" to include the expected value of a given
performance.
162. Id. at 26.
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such active consumer choices. 163
C. Other Unconscionability Problems
The standard form presents enough peculiarities to be studied in a sep-
arate section, but the general problem of unconscionability arises in at
least three other settings. The first of those settings involves contractual
parties who entered transactions on price terms inferior to those gener-
ally prevailing in the market. The second involves contractual parties
who contend that the price terms of their contract are unfair, not because
they are inferior to the market price, but because the market price is itself
monopolistic or unfair. The third setting involves contractual parties
who contend that certain nonprice terms of their contract are unfair and
should be replaced by court-imposed nondisclaimable terms.
1. Contracting at Terms Inferior to the Market Price
It has been shown that the poor pay more for goods and services than
the affluent, but commentators differ on the cause of this phenomenon. 16
Some have argued that the phenomenon represents merchant exploita-
tion of consumers who do not fit the neoclassical conception of rational
economic agents165 while others attribute the higher prices to real cost
differences. 166 Faced with this uncertainty about the reason the poor pay
more, courts must decide whether to hold contracts entered into by the
163. See infra Part III.C.3.
164. One author describes the phenomenon as-follows:
Because of their dissimilarity to the ideal consumers of modern economics and
legislation, the poor pay prices for food, rent, medicine and durables almost
always exceeding those paid by the more affluent, and usually exceeding those
needed to yield a fair return on the businessman's investment .... The low
income consumer pays between 5 per cent and 10 per cent more for the same
groceries purchased in his own neighborhood than does a middle income con-
sumer.... Some other stores, such as co-operatives or private stores selling in
particularly high volume have prices more than 15 per cent below those pre-
dominating in the low income areas. Low income neighborhood stores usually
price [consumer] durables 50 per cent to 100 per cent above the going rate in
more affluent areas, employing markups of 300 or 400 per cent and giving com-
missions running as high as 100 per cent of the value of the goods.
Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 Yale L.J. 745, 755-57 (1967) (footnotes
omitted).
165. See id. at 749-54. According to the author, the poor often do not believe in com-
parative shopping, they buy goods for status reasons, they are shy and unwilling to deal
with strangers outside their neighborhood and they are uneducated about their alterna-
tives and unmotivated to learn more about them. See id.
166. As one study noted:
Despite their substantially higher prices, net profit on sales for low-income mar-
ket retailers was only slightly higher and net profit return on net worth was
considerably lower when compared to general market retailers. It appears that
salaries and commissions, bad debt losses, and other expenses are substantially
higher for low-income market retailers.
Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report of Installment Credit and Retail Sales in
the District of Columbia 39 (1968).
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poor on terms inferior to those paid by the nonpoor unconscionable.' 67
The Austrian school of economics can make three important contribu-
tions to this debate. The first concerns the subjective character of a
"good" and the need to avoid the fallacy of assuming that a good can be
defined by its physical properties alone. 168  The "same" consumer
durables sold in two different stores may be entirely different goods in an
economic sense if one store is more conveniently located for relatively
immobile consumers or is more willing to sell the durable to uncertain
credit risks. If the court required approximate parity of the physical
item's price in the two stores, it could create a disincentive to producing
the "good" consisting of the high-priced durable plus the attendant
services. 169
A second consideration is that the Austrian school does not make the
neoclassical assumption that consumers are rational; 170 it asserts instead
that rationality is a trait learned over time. 17' Thus, to the Austrians, the
problem is twofold. Because the knowledge needed to make efficient eco-
nomic decisions is diffuse, the court will find it extremely difficult to dis-
tinguish rational choices made under a particular set of financial
constraints from truly irrational action. 172 Moreover, even if the court in
a rough way could isolate and rectify the irrational economic decisions,
its doing so would tend to inhibit the only lasting method of protecting
consumers-for consumers to learn increasingly rational, and thus effi-
cient, behavior over time. 17
3
The most important Austrian contribution, however, is to stress the
qualitative difference between the risk of serious if not catastrophic judi-
cial mistakes in this area as compared to the more limited risk of
merchant overcharges. The essential difference is that overcharges ex-
167. Professors White and Summers offer the following suggestion:
A reasonable alternative ... would be for the court to allow ... a prima facie
case either by showing a markup of two or three times, or by showing that the
price at which the product was sold was two or three times greater than at least
one other available price-in the ghetto or elsewhere .... After the buyer
makes out his prima facie case, then the plaintiff-merchant would be permitted
under 2-302(2) to rebut the buyer's case by showing that his net return or net
profit was not excessive.
J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 159-60 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis in
the original).
168. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
169. This has been the experience with Robinson-Patman laws, which tend to cause
incongruities by prohibiting differences between what are in fact different markets. See T.
Sowell, supra note 63, at 209-12.
170. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. On the mistakes government has made by incorrectly assuming that racial minori-
ties behaved irrationally, see T. Sowell, Markets and Minorities 108-21 (1981).
173. See T. Sowell, supra note 63, at 110-I1 (discussing the idea of effective feedback).
Of course, given the present distribution of legal services, the number of invalidations to
be expected may be too small to have much effect on feedback. It would not seem appro-
priate, however, to have legal rights that would be unacceptable as soon as large numbers
of people began to assert them.
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hibit self-correcting proclivities that judicial decisions do not. Suppose a
merchant attempted to justify to a court a one hundred percent markup
on consumer durables in poor areas, arguing that the costs of doing busi-
ness there were higher. An important feature of the Austrian critique is
that government officials have great difficulty in accurately measuring
costs in a particular industry.174 If the court rejects the merchant's de-
fense and turns out to be wrong, whole segments of the economy of the
poor may disappear. By contrast, if the overcharge really was unjustified
by costs yet the court allowed the overcharge anyway, entrepreneurs
would at least have an incentive to direct further resources into poor
areas until the overcharges were to some extent eroded. 75 Of course,
when door-to-door sales people or other merchants have obviously pro-
cured a sale by questionable means, a declaration of unconscionability is
eminently sensible. The three Austrian arguments are directed against a
finding of unconscionability on the basis of an alleged price disparity
alone.
2. Contracting at Monopolistic Market Prices and Wages
Another area of unconscionability concerns claims that a contract
should be set aside, not because one party failed to understand its terms
or because the contract was made at a price inferior to the market price,
but because the market price is itself monopolistic or unfair. "'76 A great
deal of serious overstatement has pervaded legal commentary on this is-
sue. Consider, for example, the following treatment of the subject by
Professor Unger:
Gross inequalities of bargaining power... are all too common in the
current forms of market economy, a fact shown not only by the deal-
ings between individual consumers and large corporate enterprises, but
also by the huge disparities of scale and market influence among enter-
prises themselves. Thus, the doctrine of economic duress must serve as
a roving commission to correct the most egregious and overt forms of
an omnipresent type of disparity. But the unproven assumption of the
doctrine is that the amount of corrective intervention needed to keep a
contractual regime from becoming a power order will not be so great
that it destroys the vitality of decentralized decisionmaking through
174. See id. at 169 ("The costs of an industry are difficult-if not impossible-for third
parties to determine.... [C]osts are foregone options-and options are always prospec-
tive.... Government regulations and their estimates of 'cost' are based on objective
statistical data on actual outlays.") (emphasis in original). If such "overcharges" in the
ghetto are not aberrational but systematic and common, it is extremely likely that the
court's factual premise is indeed wrong.
175. See J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 36-38 (1962) (contrast-
ing market and political relationships by noting that the former encourage more rational
decisionmaking by punishing irrational choices).
176. On the distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability, see
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L Rev.
485, 487 (1967).
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contract. 177
From the Austrian perspective, of course, perfect competition is no-
where to be found. But if "gross inequalities" and "huge disparities"
were indeed "omnipresent," profitable opportunities for competitors
would have been created and long ago seized. The principal fallacy of
Unger's argument is the emphasis it places on "bargaining."' 78 From the
time of Carl Menger, Austrians have stressed that competition provides
an alternative to bargaining and that the range of indeterminacy where
bargaining is necessary tends to narrow as competition becomes more
vigorous.179 Indeed, competition is particularly necessary where one
party will inevitably be a weak bargainer. In the area of labor relations,
for example, an argument often made against freedom of contract is that
employers can negotiate by out-waiting employees who need their wages
for food and housing.18° In fact, what this argument tends to establish is
the helplessness of workers under any system that depends on bargaining
with employers. To the Austrians, this argument misses the fact that the
essential dynamic of the market process is not bargaining 8, but the con-
tinuous creation of new profit opportunities followed by the competitive
erosion of those opportunities.18 In the case of labor, for example, one
entrepreneur perceives the opportunity to increase profits by employing
capital and other resources to raise the productivity of labor, and the
resulting gap between the workers' new marginal product and their
wages creates additional profit opportunities for other entrepreneurs who
compete for that now underpaid labor.'83
Of course, the Austrians do not contend that these adjustments occur
in the instantaneous manner hypothesized by neoclassical models. Labor
and other markets may be characterized by slow adjustments, impedi-
ments to new entry 84 and serious informational problems in the discov-
ery of new opportunities. 85 One's instinctive reaction to these problems
177. Unger, supra note 50, at 629.
178. For criticism of the concept of "bargaining power," see Kennedy, supra note 42,
at 615-17; Rakoff, supra note 135, at 1192-94.
179. See L. Lachmann, supra note 95, at 84; C. Menger, supra note 2, at 196-97.
180. See Unger, supra note 50, at 630 ("If labor were not allowed to organize and to
bargain collectively, the disparity between the contract model and economic reality
would remain immense and unmistakable in a central aspect of social life. It would then
be clear that the only kind of correction capable of distinguishing contract from subjuga-
tion would be one that effectively abolished contract by policing all of the terms or cor-
recting all of the outcomes.").
181. See L. Lachmann, supra note 95, at 84 ("In fact, the competitive price sysem by
its very existence sets fairly narrow limits to the area within which wage-rates could be
determined by bargaining.").
182. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
183. See M. Friedman & R. Friedman, supra note 29, at 246.
184. On the problem of governmentally created barriers, and an argument for holding
them unconstitutional, see Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Com-
petition, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 91 (1983).
185. On the significance of consumer ignorance of market opportunities, see Eisenberg,
supra note 37, at 781.
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is that judicial revision of unfair monopolistic contracts is at least justi-
fied in the interim before the market can restore efficient competitive
pricing. From the Austrian perspective, however, this interim approach
suffers from two fundamental defects. The first is that it assumes a court
can come reasonably close to approximating the true competitive price, a
preposterous assumption from the Austrian perspective.'8 6 Prices, even
seriously imperfect ones, nevertheless embody the wisdom of millions of
market participants, acting on their widely diffused knowledge of the
scarcity of that good, its potential substitutes in production and con-
sumption and the scarcity of each resource needed to produce the good
and the thousands of alternative uses for each such resource.
The second problem is that even if by some miracle the court correctly
perceived that the contract price was X percent above or below the com-
petitive price, from a dynamic perspective the intervention still would be
unjustified. Supracompetitive prices play two important roles in the Aus-
trian conception of the market process: the expectation of supracompeti-
tive profits is the motivating force of the creative entrepreneur' 87 and the
existence of such profits once created signals the market to direct more
resources toward the industry in question. 8 8 Thus, even if the court
could correctly identify and expunge the "monopoly" element in every
contract price, its doing so would stifle the market process on which pro-
gressive increases in efficiency depend. 8 9
186. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 81.
188. See Hayek I, supra note 5, at 526, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 86.
189. In general, the courts have been extremely hesitant to hold the price term of a
contract unconscionable when the contract price simply reflected the market price. Mo-
bile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507 (Fla. App. 1975) deserves to become a true
"leading case" in this area. The plaintiff corporation sought to replevy a mobile home,
and the defendant argued that the installment sales contract charged an unconscionable
interest rate of 11.75%. See id. at 507. The trial court accepted the defense, but the
appellate court reversed:
[W]e find no case which even comes close to declaring an interest rate of
11.75% on an installmient sales contract "unconscionable." Indeed, most cases
finding unconscionability do so by considering terms other than price. Of those
cases dealing with price at all, most require, in addition to a grossly excessive
price, some element of nondisclosure, fraud, overreaching or a manifestly une-
qual bargaining position. Only a few courts have indicated that an excessive
price disparity may be sufficient of itself under [the unconscionability provision
of the Uniform Commercial Code], but such cases involved grossly excessive
prices and finance charges considering average market conditions. In any case,
no such comparison was made in the trial court's judgment here appealed from
and it is common knowledge, to which judges are no less privy, that an 11.75%
annual percentage rate is within the limits prevalent in the current status of the
installment sales market.
Id. at 507-08 (emphasis in original).
This excellent decision should not be clouded by the court's reference to possible dis-
charge when a "manifestly unequal bargaining position" exists. It is extremely unlikely
that the mobile home purchasers were able to "bargain" the corporate seller down from,
say, 14% to 11.75% interest. Competition, not altruism or bargaining, caused lenders to
offer an interest rate below 14%.
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3. Contracting at Harsh Nonprice Terms and
the Nondisclaimable Duty
Price and nonprice terms of a contract differ in two ways. First, price
terms are uniquely visible and comprehensible. Even in consumer con-
tracts, it is generally a fair assumption that both parties know what the
price term is and what it means. Second, nonprice terms typically im-
pose a cost on one party different from the value they confer on the
other. A price of $5000 means a loss to the consumer and a gain to the
producer of $5000. By contrast, a consumer's right to engage the seller
in complex factual litigation might have a value of $5000 to the con-
sumer but impose a cost on the producer of $10,000.
If both parties were fully informed about the nonprice as well as the
price terms, the problem of inefficient contract clauses that impose a
greater cost on one party than the value they confer on the other would
not arise. Professor Markovits has made this point in the context of dis-
cussing building code requirements, a form of legislated non-disclaimable
duty:
[I]n an otherwise Pareto optimal world, housing code enforcement
would be misallocative. Inasmuch as landlords did not choose to sup-
ply their tenants with code-quality housing in the first place, the pri-
vate dollar cost to the landlord of upgrading sub-code housing must
have exceeded its private dollar value to the tenant. 190
Moreover, it is important to realize that if tenants were fully informed,
this conclusion would not be affected by saying that landlords have supe-
rior "bargaining power" or even monopoly power in a particular market.
The presence of monopoly power only influences the ultimate value of
the contract to the landlord and tenant; neither party has an incentive to
employ an inefficient form for obtaining that value. Professor Schwartz
has stressed this idea in the context of discussing product warranties: "If
a monopolist's customers prefer to have warranties rather than disclaim-
ers, and if these customers will pay the premium for additional warranty
protection, the monopolist would be irrational not to offer a warranty.
Offering only a disclaimer would cost him potential profits."'' The
problem, of course, is that tenants are not fully informed about the terms
on which they are contracting with landlords. 192 From the point of view
of the Austrian school, however, this is the beginning, not the end, of the
analysis, because the government itself suffers from the problem of lim-
ited knowledge.'93
This inherent limitation on the government's knowledge of relevant
190. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability
of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1815, 1831
(1976).
191. Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev.
1053, 1072 (1977).
192. See Markovits, supra note 190, at 1838.
193. See supra Part III.C.2.
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facts has often been overlooked in the literature. An extraordinary
amount of ink has been spilled, for example, on the question of whether
ideal building codes are efficient and beneficial to the poor. 94 From the
Austrian perspective, this emphasis is entirely misplaced. The Austrians
freely concede that the market at any point in time is far from Pareto
optimality, and thus an ideal nondisclaimable duty certainly could im-
prove efficiency. The problem is precisely that the state lacks the infor-
mation and the incentive needed to fix such ideal rules in the first
instance or to change them once its initial assignment of rights proves
erroneous. 1
95
In fact, one important point that the Austrians stress is that the
"ideal" rule governing, say, landlord-tenant relations, is extremely un-
likely to be the same for all buildings or for all people. As noted earlier,
the Austrians insist that the factors of production are not generic catego-
ries like "land, .... labor" and "capital,"' 9 6 and it is similarly risky to
speak as if the housing market consisted of generic "apartments" and
"tenants." Nondisclaimable duties imposed on all landlords for the ben-
efit of all tenants are likely to have quite different consequences for vari-
ous segments of the housing market, and it is therefore questionable
whether any general rule could enhance efficiency for all such segments.
The problem is not simply that nondisclaimable duties might be ineffi-
cient, because in a world of imperfect information, contract clauses
might be inefficient as well. The key difference is that while private mis-
takes encourage learning and adaptation, state regulation in the Austrian
conception actually leads away from efficient outcomes over time. Each
nondisclaimable duty tends to produce a market response such as an in-
crease in price, a deterioration in other contract terms, or, if these fail, an
attempt to abandon the industry.' 97 Because these market responses
conflict with the state's intention of benefiting the weaker party, the gov-
ernment tries to head off such "escape routes" by price controls, more
nondisclaimable duties and prohibitions on exit. 198 Although such an
194. The following articles expressly limit their attention to the effects of "ideal" build-
ing codes: Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Komesar, 82 Yale L.J. 1194 (1973); Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets
on Behalf ofthe Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution
Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1093 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ackerman 1971]; Komesar, Return
to Slumville. A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the
Poor, 82 Yale L.J. 1175 (1973); Markovits, supra note 190.
195. See Schwartz, supra note 191, at 1066 ("[A] seller has a large advantage over a
court in accurately ascertaining [consumer] preferences. A seller has greater expertise in
commercial matters, better facilities for ascertaining consumer preferences, and greater
incentive to know them accurately.").
196. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
197. See L. Mises, supra note 7, at 762-64; R. Posner, supra note 148, at 69.
198. This scenario has often been played out in the housing area, with government
regulations raising the price of housing, inspiring rent increases followed by rent controls,
attempted housing abandonment and prohibitions on housing abandonment. See gener-
ally J. Brenner & H. Franklin, Rent Control in North America and Four European
Countries (1977).
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approach might succeed in temporarily "trapping" some capital, 99 it
tends in the long run to discourage production and to leave the industry
without the free pricing needed for a functioning market process. In the
Austrian conception, that is a particularly unfortunate outcome, because
rational planning and calculation require market prices and other con-
tract terms that at least approximately signal real scarcities.2°
This is not to say that the Austrian approach is dogmatically opposed
to the use of any nondisclaimable duties to replace nonprice contract
terms. Some contractual terms may simply be too difficult to understand
or may impose external costs on third parties. However, because non-
price terms signal entrepreneurs to new investments, we must preserve
the idea that nonprice as well as price terms should be, as a general rule,
disclaimable. As Hayek has stated:
We must look at the price system as... a mechanism for communicat-
ing information if we want to understand its real function-a function
which, of course, it fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid.
Even when quoted prices have become quite rigid, however, the forces
which would operate through changes in price still operate to a consid-
erable extent through changes in the other terms of the contract.201
CONCLUSION
In the Austrian conception, freedom of contract cannot be defended as
a system ensuring a completely efficient resource allocation. The Austri-
ans recognize that imperfect information and monopolistic elements will
always leave the system of free contract far short of that efficient state.
Nevertheless, because the Austrians believe that freedom of contract
leads to an increasingly efficient economy, the Austrian conception does
tend to extend the areas where freedom of contract is warranted beyond
the range envisioned by neoclassical economists.
"Efficiency" is a cold word. It must not be forgotten, however, that
the discovery of new efficiencies, which to the Austrians is the essential
purpose of freedom of contract, is the discovery of new ways to provide
things valued by flesh-and-blood human beings. Nondisclaimable duties
may reduce a worker's hours of work at the expense of wages, increase
wages at the expense of working conditions or improve working condi-
tions at the expense of job security. Some of these compulsory trade-offs
may indeed be desirable, just as the compulsory trade-offs imposed on
consumers by forcing them to pay more to secure a warranty against
personal injuries may be desirable. Nevertheless, significant expansion of
199. This argument is made by Professor Ackerman. See Ackerman 1971, supra note
194, at 1108. Over the long run, however, where decisions about structural repairs, new
partially subsidized housing or housing destruction can all be varied, the results may be
quite different from these short-run expectations.
200. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
201. Hayek I, supra note 5, at 526, reprinted in F. Hayek, supra note 5, at 86 (paren-
theses omitted).
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the workers' or consumers' options in all their dimensions requires dis-
covery of new efficiencies-new options created by higher productivity-
brought to workers and consumers by the competitive process. The Aus-
trian school of economics suggests it is this process to which contract law
can make an important contribution.

